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LIABILITY FOR URBAN RIOT DAMAGE
In the summer of 1967, racial tensions in Newark, New Jersey
erupted into uncontrollable mass violence which overwhelmed two-
thirds of the city and lasted three to four days. Twenty-nine homes
and 1029 business establishments were damaged or destroyed, and
property losses amounted to $15 million., A & B Auto Stores, Inc. v.
City of Newark2 consolidated 3 450 suits instituted against the City of
Newark for damages arising out of the disorders on the grounds of
(I) common law negligence and (2) statutory municipal liability for
riot damage.4 The court resolved the question of common law liabil-
ity against the plaintiffs because of the city's sovereign immunity.
However, relief under the riot damage statute was held to be avail-
able in light of the judicial determination that a riot, or a series of
riots, did occur within the meaning of the statute.
I. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE
Acknowledging that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has waned
considerably in New Jersey and other jurisdictions, the court never-
theless withheld common law relief in A & B Auto Stores because a
city's immunity is generally retained with regard to discretionary
municipal functions even though municipal liability is extended in
other areas.5 Discretionary functions consist of governmental policy
1. 106 N.J. Super. 491, 256 A.2d 110 (Super. Ct. 1969).
2. Id.
3. The consolidated trial was only for the purpose of resolution of common
issues, basically whether the city could be held liable.
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-1 (1952): "When, by reason of a mob or riot,
any property, real or personal, is destroyed or injured, the municipality if it has
a paid police force, in which the mob congregates or riot occurs, or, if not in
such a municipality, the county in which such property is or was situate, shall be
liable to the person whose property was so destroyed or injured for the damages
sustained thereby, recoverable in an action by or in behalf of such person."
5. Even where governmental immunity has purportedly been abolished, the
protective niche for discretionary (or governmental-in jurisdictions retaining the
traditional governmental-proprietary distinction) functions has been adopted or
sustained. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457
(1961), heralded as the case abolishing sovereign immunity, provided an exemp-
tion for discretionary acts in California. Subsequent legislation undercut the
effect of this decision by immunizing a municipality from liability arising from
failure to enforce any law. Thus, in Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App.
2d 803, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1969), it was held that the
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determinations immune from liability because they involve political
issues which are not judicially reviewable. 6 Accordingly, in the ab-
sence of a statute, governments are held immune from liability for
injuries resulting from the exercise or non-exercise of the general
police power 7 including the failure to provide adequate police pro-
tection from riots or ordinary crimes.8
II. STATUTORY LIABILiTY
Although Newark escaped common law liability, its sovereign im-
munity did not bar the application of the New Jersey riot damage
statute.9 That enactment imposes strict liability whenever a mob or
riot results in property damage in a municipality maintaining a paid
police force. Since Newark did maintain a paid police force, its
liability was contingent upon the civil disorder of July, 1967 being
considered a "mob" or a 'riot", within the meaning of the statute.
Neither term is defined in the statute, but a related statute providing
municipality was not liable for failure to provide police protection during the
Watts riot of 1965. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the California legislature had
responded to the Muskopf decision by repealing its riot damage statute on the
ground that it was no longer necessary. See also, Williams v. City of Detroit, 364
Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div.
443, 95 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1950); Simon v. City of New York, 53 Misc. 2d 622,
279 N.Y.S.2d 223 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967); Barnum v. State, 435 P.2d 678
(Wash, 1967); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1968).
6. The discretionary limitation is supported as being necessary to retain an
orderly governmental process, including adherence to constitutionally and statu-
torily ordained distributions of political power. Were every decision of a discre-
tionary nature which has been entrusted to the municipality subject to review
by lay juries, the operation of government would be severely hindered. Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 59 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
"Public officials must be free to determine these questions without fear of
liability either for themselves or for the public entity they represent. It cannot
be a tort for government to govern." Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42
N.J. 541, 550, 201 A.2d 726, 730 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685 (1968); Bergen
v. Koppenal, 97 N.J. Super. 263, 235 A.2d 30 (Super. Ct. 1967), aff'd as modi-
fied, 52 N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968).
8. See, e.g., Westminster Investing Corp. v. Murphy Co., 296 F. Supp. 1300
(D.D.C. 1969); Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 240 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1969); Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361,
243 N.E.2d 214 (1968); Roy v. Town of Hampton, 226 A.2d 870 (N.H. 1967).
9. Supra note 4. Statutes providing either damages for riot losses or damages
for mob and/or riot losses shall be referred to within this comment as "riot dam-
age statutes." Statutes providing damages for mob losses only shall be referred
to as 'mob damage statutes."
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relief for both property damage and personal injury caused by mob
action defines "mob" as:
[A] collection of individuals-five or more in number-assembled
or the unlawful purpose of offering violence to the person or
property of any one supposed to have been guilty of the viola-
tion of a law, or for the purpose of exercising correctional powers
or regulative powers over any person, by violence and without
lawful authority .... 20
Plaintiffs did not argue that the disturbance constituted mob action
because it was obvious that the facts did not conform to the definition
in the mob damage statute. Essentially then, the principal inter-
pretive problem lay in determining whether the disturbance was a
riot.
Unlike "mob," "riot" is not defined in any New Jersey statute.
Historically, "mob" and "riot" have been used interchangeably within
the context of riot damage statutes, and some confusion of the terms
has resulted."1 But the court in A & B Auto Stores rejected the city's
contention that "riot" is synonymous with "mob"12 and turned to
the common law meaning of the term to formulate a definition for
purposes of applying the riot damage statute. The court held that
"[a] riot is simply a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by a group
of three or more persons having a common purpose who act in con-
cert to accomplish their purpose through force or violence."' 3 It
also stated that the concept of "riot" could not be limited by such
factors as the number of disorders, the intensity of the disorders, the
quantity or geographic breadth of the resultant harm, the number
of riotous groups involved, the underlying cause of the disorders, or
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-8 (1952). '"Mob" is similarly defined in a
section providing criminal sanctions for participation in mob action. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:126-1 (1952). Had personal injuries alone been involved or had
plaintiffs elected to sue under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-8 instead of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:48-1, only the occurrence of a mob would have resulted in liability
and recovery in the instant case would have been foreclosed. OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 3761.01 (1953), defines mob as "[A] collection of people assembled for
an unlawful purpose and intending to do damage or injury to anyone, or pre-
tending to exercise correctional power over other persons by violence and without
authority of law." The statute also requires an intention to lynch.
11. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Kansas City, 175 Kan. 729, 267 P.2d 931 (1954),
and Koska v. City of Kansas City, 123 Kan. 362, 255 P. 57 (1927). Although
the mob damage statutes arose to handle lynch mob situations only, they are
often sufficiently parallel to the riot damage statutes to create a false sense of
interchangeability of the terms.
12. 106 N.J. Super. at 504, 256 A.2d at 117.
13. Id. at 502, 256 A.2d at 116.
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the size of the target of violence.14 Examining the facts, the court
concluded that the evidence was overwhelming and undisputed that
a riot did occur within the meaning of the statute and thus held the
city liable.25
In addition to the instant case, New Jersey courts have decided
four other cases under the riot damage and mob damage statutes.10
No prior case defined "riot," nor did any case limit the applicability
of the statute by the nature of the disorder.
With few exceptions, riot or mob damage statutes in other juris-
dictions1 7 have been interpreted as infrequently as the New Jersey
statutes. In the absence of an express statutory definition of "riot,"
the courts have traditionally relied upon common law and criminal
law definitions.18 A number of cases have refined the borrowed con-
cept of "riot" by specifying various factors not to be regarded as
limiters in determining the occurrence of a riot. Two early cases
agree with the New Jersey court that the size and strength of the
disturbance are immaterial to the applicability of a riot damage
statute. 0 Courts have similarly held it to be irrelevant whether the
14. Id. at 507, 256 A.2d at 119.
15. The court did not determine damages. That issue was to be resolved at in-
dividual hearings at which the city could raise the statutory defenses of lack of
notice and/or contributory negligence.
16. Clark Thread Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, 54
N.J.L. 265, 23 A. 820 (1892); Carey v. City of Paterson, 47 N.J.L. 365, 1 A. 473
(1885); Hailey v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. Misc. 139, 36 A.2d 210 (C.P. Essex
County 1944); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City, 207 F.
871 (D.N.J. 1913), aff'd., 219 F. 699 (3d Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 650
(1916).
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-201
(1949); Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 411:100 (1963); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3354
(1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, §2 1-3 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
269, § 8 (1965); Mo. Rnv. STAT. 2§ 537.140-160 (1959); MONT. RV. CODES
ANN. § 11-1503 (1947); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:53 (1955); OHso REV.
CODE ANN. § 3761.01 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11821 (1956); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-15-13 (1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-107 (1962); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-6-12 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. § 66.091 (1961). Except for
Kansas, Ohio and Wisconsin, no state has had more than one or two cases; Maine
and Missouri have had none.
18. Note, Compensation for Victims of Urban Riots, 68 COLUmn. L. REv. 57,
69 (1968). Compare the definition of "riot" used in Adamson v. City of New
York, 188 N.Y. 225, 80 N.E. 937 (1907), construing the defunct New York riot
damage statute, which was later suspended by the New York Defense Emergency
Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 9193-3 (McKinney 1961), with a typical com-
mon law definition. See note 12 supra.
19. Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397 (1897); City of Chicago v. Penn-
sylvania Co., 119 F. 497 (7th Cir. 1902).
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unlawful common purpose was formed before or after the rioters
assembled.20 A feeling of terror in the general populace has often
been required.21 There is some question whether the parties must
entertain an intent to assist one another with force against opposi-
tion to their common purpose.2 2 No other jurisdiction has attempted
as comprehensive a definition of "riot" as that of the New Jersey
court in the instant case.23 Thus, while A & B Auto Stores is not
the first case to interpret the meaning of "riot" under a riot damage
statute, it is clearly one of the first to contribute substance to this
ambiguous term.
The court assured maximum applicability of the statute by adopt-
ing the classic common law definition 24 and enumerating several
factors to be excluded from consideration in determining whether a
riot occurred. This interpretation permanently divorces the concept
of "riot" from any connotation of "mob" or "insurrection."'25 A mob
entails the purpose of offering violence to exert correctional or regu-
lative power over a law violator, and an insurrection offers purposive,
organized resistance to established government. Both terms require
a preconcerted plan or purpose. But for a riot, the court held that a
general purpose to destroy and injure was sufficient. While both a
mob and an insurrection are purposive and goal-oriented, a riot is
purposeless and random. Since recent disturbances have been pre-
dominantly spontaneous and non-purposive in nature, the court's
characterization is a significant accommodation of the riot damage
20. City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S.W. 269 (1902);
Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 238 Mass. 538, 131 N.E. 220 (1921).
21. See, e.g., Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 238 Mass. 538, 131 N.E. 220
(1921); Febock v. Jefferson County, 219 Wis. 154, 262 N.W. 583 (1935).
22. Compare Yalenezian v. City of Boston, 238 Mass. 538, 131 N.E. 220
(1921), with Duryea v. City of New York, 10 Daly 300, .ff'd without opinion,
100 N.Y. 625 (1882).
23. Only Ohio, limited by a statute specifically requiring the occurrence of a
lynching, has effected any kind of dramatic liberalization of its 'tstute: A recent
case held that a cause of action under the statute was stated-that a lynching
occurred-where cab drivers were assaulted by a mob violently seeking social
reform. Parker v. Board of County Commissioners, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 77, 239 N.E.2d
124 (1969). Earlier cases were extremely technical about the lynching require-
ment. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of Commissioners, 8 Ohio App. 30 (1917), and
Gray v. Gibson, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 673 (1912).
24. 106 N.J. Super. at 502, 256 A.2d at 116.
25. The court rejected the city's claim that the disorder constituted an insur-
rection rather than a riot, inasmuch as there was no armed, organized attack
upon the government. Liability would have been precluded had either an insur-
rection or a rebellion occurred. Id. at 506, 256 A.2d at 118.
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statute to the modem phenomenon of riot. Instead of the particu-
larity of "mob" or "insurrection," the new concept of "riot" embraces
a broad range of disorders, the definition being of sufficient flexibility
to assure the viability and adequacy of the statute as changes in the
form of expression of violence correspond to changes in society. The
principal danger of the court's interpretation lies in the fact that
the door is now open for application of the riot damage statute far
beyond legislative intent-to municipal liability for losses resulting
from ordinary crime.28
CONCLUSION
Although the broadened applicability of the statute may be of sig-
nificance to these plaintiffs and to future victims of urban riots in
New Jersey, it is unlikely that municipal liability for riot damage
outside that state will be affected by this decision. Only sixteen states
have any form of riot or mob damage statute.27 Those states in which
the most explosive riots have occurred and are likely to recur are
among those currently without such statutes.28 Municipal resources
are generally inadequate to cope with the problem of reparations;
in light of the financial difficulties cities have in merely conducting
normal programs and services, the added costs of restoring order and
repairing property are prohibitive. One commentator postulates the
existence of a "riot cycle," wherein the deferment of social welfare
expenditures in order to pay the costs of riot containment and re-
pair leads to frustration and further rioting.29
Rather than lending assistance to the overburdened cities, the states
have responded by limiting statutory municipal liability.o Mean-
while, the federal government has begun to assume a greater role in
the solution of urban problems in general. However, federal legis-
26. Cases rejecting municipal liability for damages resulting from crime include:
Hanners v. City of Kansas City, 154 Kan. 324, 118 P.2d 532 (1941), and
International Wire Works v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 230 Wis. 72, 283 N.W. 292
(1939).
27. Supra note 17.
28. Alabama, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New York and Tennes-
see do not have riot damage statutes.
29. Note, Recovery from Urban Riots-Toward a Comprehensive Plan, 33
ALBANY L. Rv. 582, 586 (1969).
,30. In response to the Newark riots, the New Jersey legislature in 1968
amended the riot damage statute to impose a limit of $10,000 on compensable
damages per claimant and to preclude reparations for those victims whose losses
are covered by insurance. N.J. Razv. STAT. § 2A:48-1 (1969).
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lative proposals directed at the restoration problems following liots
have generally been unsuccessful. Most proposals have been lost in
congressional committees.31 The only such proposal enacted is the
Federal Reinsurance Act,32 part of the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968, which provides federal reinsurance for private
insurance companies in order to encourage them to underwrite risks
in potential riot areas. The inattentiveness of our lawmakers and
the refusal of our judiciary to revoke municipal immunity are not
in any way indicative of a lack of urgency. Rather, deserted, gutted
buildings worsen the physical blight of the slums, abandoned busi-
nesses 3s intensify the social and economic decay, and the next urban
riots are being hastened.
Susan Spiegel Glassberg
31. See, e.g., S. 2209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2223, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); S. 2258, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 11891, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1967); H.R. 11896, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
32. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb-9 (1968).
33. Ten per cent of the business establishments destroyed or damaged in
Newark are not reopening. 68 COLUM. L. Rxv. 57, 58 (1968).
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